According to some of his followers, Fethullah Gülen was born on November 11, 1938 (the day after Kemal Atatürk died,) though his ID card lists April 27, 1941, as his birth date. He passed away on October 20, 2024. Gülen left an indelible mark on Turkey’s recent history, seen by some as a saintly "Hocaefendi" and by others as the leader of a terrorist organization. My aim here is not to recount Gülen’s life (I believe many books and documentaries will cover this in-depth in the future) but rather to explore what he left behind. Still, a brief summary of Gülen and his movement is needed first.
One can never fully know another person’s intentions, but we can witness their actions. So, what did Gülen do? He did many things. He was a highly influential preacher who had the power to inspire people; he unquestionably had the qualities of a leader, organizing and mobilizing his followers.
The foundations of the Turkish Republic were shaky from the start. Religious people needed leaders who could speak to them. Following the death of Said Nursi, who left a large Nur movement behind in 1960, Gülen emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as a preacher. The Nur side of Gülen’s rapidly forming and expanding community remained obscure and dubious. Gülen chose to name his movement "Hizmet" (meaning "service"), as if to say, "We exist to serve humanity."
Gülen was a visionary; he went beyond sermons and gave lectures, emphasizing education, establishing schools, prep courses, and universities, and did not limit himself to Turkey, sending his followers abroad. His followers were dedicated to this cause, very self-sacrificing and hardworking. They organized effectively, managing the financial side well, fueled by the contributions of these devoted members ("himmet") and the powerful allies who looked favorably upon the movement. They grew rapidly and produced successful educational, civic, and media organizations. However, the core strength of the Gülen movement was a well-educated and dedicated workforce. This workforce sprang from the heart of Anatolia; the children of families who ate on the floor tables at home were soon attending top universities and taking on prestigious roles. Yes, they were powerful, but the general public was mostly content with this; those dissatisfied were the "elites," whose time had passed. A new Turkey was emerging.
Not even the February 28 ("a postmodern coup" in 1997) could stop the Gülen movement; shortly after, Gülen moved to the United States, citing health reasons, where he would live for the rest of his life. And along with February 28, another story began in Turkey: a unique brand of political Islam that could more aptly be called "Erdoğanism" or "Reisism" rather than simply the AKP. Erdoğan and Gülen never really liked each other, but they needed one another. Erdoğan needed personnel for state positions that were to be freed from "secularists," and Gülen had the trained workforce to fill them. In the early 2000s, they grew and strengthened together for nearly a decade. Toward the end of this period, these two powerful leaders were quietly preparing to fight each other. The rest is well-known; the MİT truck scandal, the process of closing the prep schools, the December 17-25 investigations, and finally, the attempted coup on July 15.
As Ahmet Dönmez describes, there were two personalities: "Hocaefendi" and "Fethullah Gülen." Within the movement, this duality was reflected as "Hizmet" and "(Hususi) Special Hizmet." Gülen, as Hocaefendi, aimed to reach the hearts of ordinary volunteers, trying to offer a sincere piety that touched on "sensitive points" (although philosophically, his Islam was no different from the "Diyanet Islam"). Yet, at the same time, Gülen presented a grand vision for the members of the special hizmet. He instilled the need for "precaution" to achieve a future where "Hizmet" would prevail over the country, where secrecy and discretion were essential to avoid prematurely "breaking eggs." We may never fully know to what extent Gülen was involved in the huge moral and legal transgressions of this movement's special hizmet members, but his responsibility cannot be denied. Nor can his dual nature be denied.
Gülen was defeated by his own ambition. Perhaps he did not mean ill. He may have convinced himself that beautiful things could come from his principles of "relative justice (adalet-i izafiye)" (which I describe as "playing God"). But it did not end well; as he himself put it, this song was left unfinished. With the strategies he chose after 2010, he set himself and his community on the path to this tragic end. He gave too much power to those around him; he believed taking over the state was a good thing; he did not see the problem in being two different Gülen figures; he unveiled all he had hidden with his famous "mualene" (malediction). After July 15, he fell silent, perhaps suffering from a deep disappointment, with nothing more to say. In the end, he left behind a missed opportunity, a wasted story, an incantated (relatively small) community and a divided country.
Let’s explore what Gülen left behind in a bit more detail. The Gülen movement can be seen as a "personality cult." Most of its members are people who have not escaped the influence of Gülen's sermons before he left for America and his later speeches, and who, under the oppression of the country's rulers, do not want to believe the negative things said about their community. "Hocaefendi" represents their deep religious sentiment; they believe they are on the side of "truth" in the clash between truth and falsehood because they did nothing wrong; they only tried to be good Muslims and raise good people (if bad things happened, they were due to "rotten apples"). A small segment of the movement knows both the service and the special service sides well and sees no problem with either. For them, "the times called for it," and with their Hocaefendi, dreams, good tidings, and the challenges they faced, they were true followers of the Prophet. God would forgive them because their intentions were pure. After all, the special hizmet operated under a different ''sharia'' (didn't even Prophet's uncle Abbas conceal his faith as a Muslim?). And for a very small minority, it is simply a matter of power, without any emotional attachment, with no choice but to continue in what they started, having gained influence through the community.
Gülen did not leave behind only his followers. He left hundreds of thousands who once looked upon the movement favorably or at least had some association or connection. Most of these people are now troubled by the current state of the country, witnessing the oppression and beginning to question it. This questioning has led to various outcomes. Some left "the cemaat" to join other religious communities, some became "individual Muslims," some questioned Islamic history and became distant from mainstream Islam while retaining a self-defined Muslim identity, and others became agnostic, deist, or atheist. I see those who have started questioning as fortunate in this group (aside from the financial, psychological, and sociological problems they face). Walking the challenging but gratifying path of self-actualization can lead to a beautiful destination if endured.
Gülen also left behind an entire country, including many who were always skeptical of him, both devout people of various factions and those distant from religion. Today, a large majority are angry at Gülen, and rightly so, although they are not entirely blameless either—none of us are blameless. As a country, we have a fundamental problem with our understanding. As much as political Islamists and religious communities, Kemalists, those who viewed religious people as second-class citizens, Turkish and Kurdish nationalists, in short, all the "factions" have a role in this situation; we were all there!
In short, Gülen and Erdoğan fought, Gülen lost, but the country lost as well. Gülen died, without ever being judged in a fair trial. Gülen died; may God have mercy on him and forgive his sins (this is my prayer for everyone). Gülen died, but Erdoğan is still in power. The cracks in Erdoğan’s personality cult are beginning to show, but it remains strong. Gülen is gone, but there is a sociological wreckage in his wake.
The country needs a process of peace and resolution. Rather than focusing on the guilt of those who brought us to this grim state, we should consider how to emerge from it. As a Kurdish resolution process is in discussion these days, I hope a Gülen community resolution process will also be discussed. At least, Gülen’s death might lead to something positive. I am not overly optimistic, but hope is the bread of the poor.
-Isa Hafalır
0 Yorumlar